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Abstract
In this article we present a class of formulas ϕn, 0 ≤ n, that need at least 2n assumption occurrences of
other formula βn in any normal proof in Natural Deduction for purely implicational minimal propositional
logic (M→). In classical implicational logic, each ϕn have normal proofs using at most one assumption
occurrence. As a consequence, normal proofs of ϕn have exponential lower bound in M→ and linear lower
bound in its classical version. In fact, 2n is the lower-bound for cut-free Sequent proofs too. The existence of
this class of formulas have strong inﬂuence in designing automatic proof-procedures based in such systems.
It is discussed proof-theoretically how tautologies in purely implicational classical logic can be proved by
polynomially sized derivations when their minimal counterpart is exponentially sized.
Keywords: Propositional Logic Complexity, Natural Deduction, Minimal propositional logic, Proof
Theory
1 Introduction
Providing proofs for propositional tautologies seems to be a hard task. Huge proofs
are such that their size is super-polynomial with regard to the size of their conclu-
sions. Knowing that there is a classical propositional logic tautology having only
huge proofs is related to know whether NP = CoNP or not [2]. Intuitionistic logic
is PSPACE-complete [11] and Richard Statman [17] showed that purely implica-
tional minimal logic (M→) is PSPACE-complete too. We showed in [8] that, if a
propositional logic has a Natural Deduction (ND) with the sub-formula property
then it is in PSPACE. This follows from the fact that M→ polynomially encodes
any propositional logic that has such ND system. Thus, the existence of huge proofs
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for a more general class of propositional logics is related to the existence of huge
proofs in M→ that amounts to know whether PSPACE = NP or not. The re-
lations between these computational complexity classes and the existence of huge
proofs involve arbitrary proof systems, indeed. For example, NP = PSPACE is
the case, if and only if, for any M→ tautology there is a proof system that produces
a polynomially sized proof of this tautology.
A theoretical study of arbitrary proof systems is out of scope of this article.
However, studying particular proof systems for key logics, likeM→ or classical logic,
can shed some light on practical aspects of implementing propositional theorem
provers from the eﬃciency and economy of storage point of view. M→ carries
almost all the proof-theoretical and logical information to produce polynomially
bounded proofs in well-behaved 2 propositional logics. Focusing investigations on
M→ is worth of noticing.
There are many proof systems for M→. The most well-known are struc-
tural/analytic proof systems. Well-known systems are the Sequent Calculus [4],
Natural Deduction [4,14] and Tableaux [1,16] based. These systems, mainly the
ﬁrst and the third kind, are quite good in providing means to produce proofs auto-
matically. The backward chaining procedure, for example, if applied to a Sequent
Calculus based proof system provides an automatic way to produce proofs. The
problem with these proof procedures is when a decision on which rule to apply has
to be made and how to deal with non-provable formulas when it is the case. With re-
spect to this feature of dealing with invalid formulas, the literature on both systems,
Sequent Calculus and Tableaux, provides methods that either produce a proof or a
counter-model uniformly in a unique proof-procedure. Since CoPSPACE=PSPACE,
providing a counter-model in M→ is so hard as to provide a proof. The size of
the counter-model can be super-polynomial with respect to the formula. It is in-
teresting to investigate how this is related to the size of proofs in M→, or at least
to have a concrete evidence that huge proofs may be the case. Most well-known
huge proofs in the literature are considered inside Classical Logic. They are so in
Classical as well as in Minimal logic. Our intention is not only show huge proofs in
M→. We could use the polynomial translations reported in [17] or [8] to generate a
formula of the Pigeon-Hole principle from full Minimal Logic into M→. We know,
from [9], that this formula has only super-polynomially sized proofs in Resolution,
and hence in cut-free Sequent Calculus and normal Natural Deduction. It is hard
to detect from these translations why they are huge in M→, since there is nothing
speciﬁc to M→. Focusing on M→ is promising, since M→ has less combinatorial
alternatives, less logical constants, less alternative deductive system. The genesis
of huge proofs in M→ may shed some new light in propositional logic complexity.
This is emphasized by the fact that the formulas shown here do not have huge proofs
when considered Classical Reasoning. This article has the purpose of showing how
the use of Classical Logic can improve the size of proofs obtained by an automatic
proof procedure of the kind that is able to generate normal and cut-free derivations.
Developers of theorem provers have to be aware of many aspects of the logic in
2 With sub-formula property
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order to design an eﬃcient system. Any information that can guide the designer is
of some help. The number of copies of a formula in a proof can be a “bottleneck”
for an eﬃcient implementation. For saving memory an obvious solution would be
the use of references instead of copies when representing proofs. The number of
references is exponential, but references to formulas are smaller than formulas in
most of the cases. This approach points out to the use of graphs (digraphs in
fact) for representing proofs. There are a lot of developments done in this direction
reported in the literature. Most of them are more semantically than implementation
driven. Proof-nets [5] represents an approach that defends the use of graphs as the
most adequate representation for proofs. We agree with that and we consider this
a practical motivation for taking digraphs instead of trees for representing proofs
[15]
It is worth to remark on an important relationship between the size of proofs
in Hilbert systems and the size of proofs in Natural Deduction proofs as trees.
A Hilbert system is formed by a set of axiom schemata and a set of inference
rules. When we have inference rules with more than one premise, proofs may be
represented as sequences or as trees. Basically, when dealing with trees a formula
can appear more than once in the proof, if it is used more than once in it. When
dealing with sequences, formulas are referenced instead of copied. An inference
rule is applied by indicating reference to formulas already assumed in the proof.
The naive mapping of sequences into trees may point us to an apparent grow on
the size (number of formulas occurrences) in the proof. However, by means of a
quite ingenuous mechanism, Krajicek[10] proved that, for every proof Π of α, in a
Hilbert system for Classical Logic: size(Πtree) ≤ poly(size(Πseq)), where poly is a
polynomial on one variable. As Natural Deduction can be seem as a Hilbert system
with proofs represented as trees, Krajicek polynomial simulation of proofs as trees
by proofs as sequences holds for Natural Deduction. The last thing to observed
is that the rule of →-introduction is nothing more than the deduction theorem in
Hilbert system. Again, the deduction theorem can be proved in a way that the
proof of the conclusion has a size no greater than the proof of the premise. Thus,
we can base our discussion on trees in Natural Deduction and carry it to any Hilbert
system preserving conclusions modulo polynomial simulation.
In section 4 we introduce the formulas ϕn, 0 ≤ n. In section 5 we show that
they have exponentially sized normal proofs in the usual Natural Deduction for
M→. In the same section we show that this is a lower bound in M→. In classical
propositional logic, these formulas have linear-sized proofs as it is shown in section 4.
Sections 2 and 3 remind us the basics of purely implicational minimal and classical
logics, respectively.
All the formal propositional proofs/derivations in this article are presented in
Prawitz-style Natural Deduction (ND). The size of these normal proofs/derivations
is polynomially simulated by cut-free Sequent Calculus (SC) and/or Tableaux.
Thus, the lower bound shown here also applies to them.
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2 The purely implicational minimal logic
The (purely) implicational minimal logic M→ is the fragment of minimal logic
containing only the logical constant →. Its semantics is the intuitionistic Kripke
semantics restricted to → only. Given a propositional language L, a M→ model
is a structure 〈U,,V〉, where U is a non-empty set (worlds),  is a partial order
relation on U and V is a function from U into the power set of L, such that if
i, j ∈ U and i  j then V(i) ⊆ V(j). Given a model, the satisfaction relationship |=
between worlds, in the model, and formulas is deﬁned as:
• 〈U,,V〉 |=i p, p ∈ L, iﬀ, p ∈ V(i)
• 〈U,,V〉 |=i α1 → α2, iﬀ, for every j ∈ U , such that i  j, if 〈U,,V〉 |=j α1
then 〈U,,V〉 |=j α2.
Obs: In (full) minimal logic, ⊥ has no special meaning, so there is no item
declaring that 〈U,,V〉 
|=i ⊥. We remind that M→ does not have the ⊥ in its
language.
As usual a formula α is valid in a model M, namely M |= α, if and only if, it
is satisﬁable in every world i of the model, namely ∀i ∈ UM |=i α. A formula is
a M→ tautology, if and only if, it is valid in every model. A formula is satisﬁable
in M→ if it is valid in a model M of M→. The problem of knowing whether a
formula is satisﬁable or not is trivial in M→. Every formula is satisﬁable in the
model 〈{},,V〉, where  is the only world, and p ∈ V(), for every p. Thus, SAT
is not an interesting problem in M→. The same cannot be told about knowing
whether a formula is a M→ tautology or not.
It is known that Prawitz Natural Deduction system for minimal logic with only
the→-rules (→-Elim and→-Intro below) is sound and complete for theM→ Kripke
semantics. As a consequence of this, Gentzen’s LJ system [18] containing only right
and left →-rules is also sound and complete. As it is well-known one of these rules
is not invertible 3 . A naive proof-procedure based on backward chaining for M→,
based only on this usual Gentzen sequent calculus is not possible. In the next
section we present and discuss a main aspect of a Natural Deduction system for the
purely implicational classical logic.
[α]
|
β →-Intro
α → β
α α → β →-Elim
β
3 Purely implicational classical logic
If we consider only the logical constant→ we can distinguish the minimal provability
from its classical counter-part. Peirce’s formula for example, namely ((A → B) →
A) → A, is not provable in minimal logic and it is provable in classical logic. In
3 A rule is invertible, iﬀ, whenever the premises are valid the conclusion is valid and whenever any premise
is invalid the conclusion is also invalid
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[A]a →-I
((A → B) → A) → A [(((A → B) → A) → A) → B]c
→-E
B a →-I
A → B [((A → B) → A)]b →-E
A b → −I
((A → B) → A) → A
cP − rule
((A → B) → A) → A
Figure 1. Proof of Peirce’s formula using the P -rule in K→
[12], it is discussed a Natural Deduction system for Purely implicational Classical
logic (K→ ) with normalization procedure and polynomial translation to M→ on
the basis of a Glyvenko-like theorem. In this section we summarize the main results
in [12] that have to do with the examples discussed in this article.
The system presented in [12] is strongly based on Peirce’s rule. In fact, to
prove Peirce’s formula it is enough to add the following rule (P -rule) to the Natural
Deduction for M→.
[α → β]
|
α
P -ruleα
Using this rule, it is easy to derive Peirce’s formula as it is shown in ﬁgure 1.
Since the P -rule is not neither an introduction rule, nor an elimination rule,
it is specially considered. Permutation reduction, as Seldin’s reduction for the ⊥-
classical rule in Natural Deduction, is taken as the main reduction step in obtaining
a normal derivation from any derivation, as described in [12]. There a deﬁnition
of a normal form, called P-normal form, is provided. This deﬁnition, shown below,
uses the concept of branch in a derivation. A branch in a derivation Π is a sequence
δ0, . . . , δk of formula occurrences in Π, such that, δ0 is a hypothesis, discharged
or not. δk is a minor premise of an →-E rule or the conclusion of Π and, for
each i = 0, . . . , k − 1, δi is the major premise of an →-E or the premise of an
→-introduction of a rule that has δi+1 as conclusion.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A derivation Π in K→ is in P-normal form, iﬀ, for every branch
in Π, there is no formula occurrence that is premise of an elimination rule and
conclusion of an introduction rule, besides that, no P -rule conclusion in Π is premise
of an →-E or an →-I application rule in this branch.
For example the derivation above of ((A → B) → A) → A is a P-normal
derivation. The reduction on derivations, called permutation here, shown in ﬁgure 2,
ensures that any derivation Π of α from Γ in K→ can be transformed in a derivation
Π′, of α from Γ, having each application of a P -rule in Π discharging a formula of
the form β → A, with A atomic. By iterated applications of the reduction in ﬁgure 2
we obtain atomic formulas as the right-hand sides of the implications discharged by
any P -rule application.
A P-normal derivation/proof where each application of the P -rule discharges
formulas of the form α → A, with A atomic, is said to be an atomically expanded
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[β1 → (β2 → β3)]a
Π
β1 a
β1 transforms into
[β1]
b [β1 → β3]a
β3
β2 → β3 b
β1 → (β2 → β3)
Π
β1 a
β1
Figure 2. Reducing the degree of the right-hand side of the discharged formula in a P -rule app
P-normal derivation/proof, also called an AEP-normal derivation/proof. In [12] it
is shown the following theorem:
Theorem 3.2 Every derivation Π of α from Γ = {γ1, . . . , γk} in K→ can be trans-
formed into an AEP-normal derivation of α from Γ in K→ .
From the form of the branches in an AEP-normal derivation it is drawn the fol-
lowing statement, which is also called a Glyvenko theorem, because of its similarity
with the original Glyvenko correspondence between provability in classical and in
intuitionistic logic. See [6] and [13] for an updated and detailed presentation.
Theorem 3.3 Let α be a purely implicational formula and {p1, . . . , pk} the set of
propositional variables occurring in α. Thus, K→ α, if and only if, M→ (α →
p1) → ((α → p2) . . . ((α → pn) → α) . . .).
From the proof of the above theorem, in [12], we can conclude that:
Lemma 3.4 Let Π be an AEP-normal proof of α in K→ , such that, the size
(number of formula occurrences) of Π is s, then the normal proof of (α → p1) →
((α → p2) . . . ((α → pn) → α) . . .) in M→ is bounded by s2
The above lemma says that normal proofs in K→ are polynomially simulated in
M→.
Although K→ proves Peirce law, it is not a complete classical system. What it
lacks has to do with the intuitionistic negation. In order to have a complete system
we have to add the intuitionistic absurdity rule 4 . This system we call KI→ . In
this system we can deﬁne the negation ¬α as α → ⊥.
⊥
β
There is a restricted form of the rule above, whenever we consider β atomic,
that is, from ⊥ infer B, with B atomic. This restriction is not essential. Using the
following transformation repeatedly we transform any proof of α in KI→ in a proof
of α in KI→ using the atomic version of ex-falso-sequitur-quolibet, instead of its
general version. This reduction to the atomic applications only is due to Prawitz
(see [14]).
4 Also known by ex-falso-sequitur-quodlibet principle
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Π
⊥
β1 → β2 transforms into
Π
⊥
β2 →-I
β1 → β2
The system including the intuitionistic absurdity rule, instead of the general one,
is also complete and sound for purely implicational classical logic 5 . The system with
atomic intuitionistic absurdity rule is a good help understanding how polynomially
simulate KI→ in K→ . The following proposition is the basis of this polynomial
simulation, since it deals with a polynomially bounded translation of formulas. This
proposition is a variation on the translation that Ingebrigt Johansson deﬁne from
intuitionistic logic into minimal logic.
Proposition 3.5 Let α be a formula in the language {→,⊥}, such that {p1, . . . , pk}
is the set of propositional variables occurring in α. If r 
= pi, for each i, and α is
the formula (r → p1) → ((r → p2) . . . ((r → pn) → α) . . .), then KI→ α, if and
only if, K→ α.
The mentioned results imply that the existence of huge proofs in classical logic
implies the existence of huge proofs in M→. This article, by means of material
exposed in the next sections, investigates how some these huge, so to say super-
polynomially bounded, proofs are and how the use of classical reasoning can cut oﬀ
in some cases this super-polynomial lower-bound.
4 Needing exponentially many assumptions
In [3] we can ﬁnd a discussion on the fact that when proving theorems in a logic
weaker than classical logic, the need of using an assumption more than once has
a strong inﬂuence on how complex is the proof procedure and consequently the
decision procedure for this logic. There, we can ﬁnd the formula ((((A → B) →
A) → A) → B) → B. Considering the proof systems of ND and CS mentioned in
the previous section, this formula needs to use the assumption ((A → B) → A) →
A) → B at least twice in order to be proved in M→. Inspired by this example, we
can deﬁne a class of formulas with no bounds on the use of assumptions. This shows
that limiting the use of assumptions in an automatic proof-procedure for M→ is
not an alternative that ensures completeness. In the sequel we deﬁne the class of
formulas. Below you ﬁnd a normal proof of ((((A → B) → A) → A) → B) → B.
Note that it cannot be proved with less than the use of 2 assumptions (((A → B) →
A) → A) → B.
The following formula combines two instances of the formula mentioned above
in order to have a formula that needs 4 times an assumption.
((((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ) → C (1)
where ξ = (((D → C) → D) → D) → C.
5 Of course this system without Peirce’s rule is sound and complete for purely implicational intuitionistic
logic
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In ﬁgure 4 we show a normal derivation of this formula 1 above. We can see
that it has 4 assumptions of ((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ). They are from the two
assumption occurrences in the derivation Σ shown in ﬁgure 3, that is used twice in
the proof in ﬁgure 4
[A]1
((A → ξ) → A) → A (((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ
ξ
1
A → ξ [(A → ξ) → A]2
A
2
((A → ξ) → A) → A (((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ
ξ
Figure 3. The derivation Σ that is used in ﬁgure 4
We can see how to use this pattern such that if it is repeated n-times we deﬁne
a formula ϕn, such that, any normal proof of ϕn has to use an assumption at least
2n times, see section 5. Before we proceed with ϕn deﬁnition, we have to show that
the need for repeating assumptions is not the case for classical propositional logic.
Consider now that the logic is the purely implicational classical logic, K→ ,
instead of the purely implicational minimal logic. Taking K→ into account, we
provide the proof of the formula 1 with only the use of one assumption, as shown
in ﬁgure 5. This comes from the fact that (((D → C) → D) → D) is an instance
of the implicational form of Peirce’s rule, so it is provable. From this proof and
ξ = (((D → C) → D) → D) → C we prove C. ξ itself is provable by means of a
proof of the Peirce’s formula ((A → ξ) → A) → A) and the (((A → ξ) → A) →
A) → ξ discharged to prove the desired formula. The purely implicational classical
logic can be also seen in [7] where we can ﬁnd a detailed presentation of the purely
implicational classical logic with some proof-theoretic results in sequent calculus,
instead of Natural Deduction, as in [12]. The use of classical logic can, in some
cases, for example this case, turn proofs smaller.
[D]3
(((D → C) → D) → D)
[(((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ]5
Σ
ξ
C
3
D → C [(D → C) → D]4
D
4
((D → C) → D) → D
[(((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ]5
Σ
ξ
C
5
((((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ) → C
Figure 4. Proof of the formula ξ2 in purely implicational minimal logic
5 No bounds for occurrence assumptions in M→
In this section we prove that for each n there is a formula ϕn, such that, any normal
proof of ϕn has at least 2
n occurrence assumptions of the same formula, that are
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ΠPeirce2
((D → C) → D) → D
ΠPeirce1
((A → ξ) → A) → A [(((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ]1
ξ
C
1
((((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ) → C
Figure 5. Proof of the formula ξ2 in purely implicational classical logic
all of them discharged in only one introduction rule. The following proposition 5.4
shows that 2n is an upper bound by showing the normal proof that uses 2n assump-
tions for proving ϕn. Theorem 5.5 shows that there is no normal proof for any of
the ϕn, in M→, with less than 2n assumptions discharged. In the sequel we deﬁne
ϕn. As it was already said in section 4, ϕn arises from an iteration process derived
from the previous examples.
Deﬁnition 5.1 Let χ[X,Y ] = (((X → Y ) → X) → X) → Y . Using χ[X,Y ] we
deﬁne recursively a family of formulas. Consider the propositional letters C and
Di, i > 0. Let ξi, i > 0, be the formula:
ξ1=χ[D1, C] (2)
ξi+1=χ[Di+1, ξi] (3)
Using this family of formulas we deﬁne the formula ϕn, n > 0, such that, for any
i ≥ 0:
ϕi+1 = ξi+1 → C
We can observe that ϕ1 = ξ1 → C can be proved by using proof Σ (shown in
ﬁgure 3), replacing ξ by C and A by D1, and applying an →-introduction as the
last rule. The obtained proof has 2 occurrence assumptions of the formula ξ1. The
proof of ϕ2 is the proof shown in ﬁgure 4, replacing ξ by ξ1, A by D2 and D by D1,
resulting in the proof shown below.
[D1]3
(((D1 → C) → D1) → D1)
[(((D2 → ξ1) → D2)
→ D2) → ξ1]5
Σ
ξ1
C
3
D1 → C [(D1 → C) → D1]4
D1
4
((D1 → C) → D1) → D1
[(((D2 → ξ1) → D2)
→ D2) → ξ1]5
Σ
ξ1
C
5
((((D2 → ξ1) → D2) → D2) → ξ1) → C
The following lemma will be used in the proof of proposition 5.4.
Lemma 5.2 In the formula ξi, i > 0, if we simultaneously replace C by ξ1, and for
each k > 0, Dk by Dk+1, the resulting formula is χ[Di+1, ξi].
Proof This lemma is proved by induction on i. For ξ1 we observe that replacing C
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by ξ1 andD1 byD2 in ξ1, the resulting formula is χ[D2, ξ1]. Assuming that for i > 0,
replacing C by ξ1 and, for each k = 1, . . . , i, simultaneously replacing Di by Di+1 in
ξi, yields χ[Di+1, ξi]. Observing that ξi+1 = χ[Di+1, ξi] and by inductive hypothesis,
simultaneous replacing C by ξ1 and Dk by Dk+1 in ξi, k = 1, i, yields ξi+1. As Di+1
does not occur in ξi, ﬁnally replacing Di+1 by Di+2 in ξi+1 = χ[Di+1, ξi+1] yields
χ[Di+2, ξi+1]. This proves the inductive step.  
Another observation is that substitutions as the above shown in the lemma,
if applied in a derivation Π in M→, do imply that the resulting tree is a valid
derivation too. This fact is justiﬁed by observing that the replacements are always
on atomic formulas and the rules of M→ do not have provisos to be unsatisﬁed as
consequence of these replacements. Thus,we have the following fact.
Fact 5.3 If Π is a derivation of α from γ1, . . . , γl and a substitution S (on atomic
formulas) is applied to Π then S(Π) is a derivation of S(α) from S(γ1), . . . ,S(γl).
Besides that, if Π is normal then S(Π) is normal too.
Proposition 5.4 For any n > 0, there is a normal proof of ϕn having 2
n occur-
rences of the same assumptions, that are discharged by the last rule of the proof.
Proof The proof proceeds by induction. The basis n = 1 is the proof Σ shown in
ﬁgure 3. This proof is inside proof in ﬁgure 6 also, occurying as a sub-derivation
of Π. Assuming that ϕi, i > 0 has a normal proof Πϕi having 2
i occurrences of
ξi discharged by its last inference rule. Thus, we have a normal derivation Π of C
from 2i occurrences of ξi, remembering that ϕi = ξi → C. We argue that if we
simultaneously replace C by ξ1, and for each k = 1, . . . , i, replace Dk by Dk+1, we
will have, by lemma 5.2 and fact 5.3, a normal derivation of ξ1 from 2
i occurrences
of χ[Di+1, ξi]. Let us call this derivation Π
. The following derivation (see ﬁgure 6)
is a derivation of C from ((((Di+1 → ξi) → Di+1) → Di+1) → ξi) → C, i.e., it is
a derivation of C from ξi+1, and hence, by an →-introduction application, we have
a normal derivation of ϕi+1 discharging 2
i + 2i = 2i+1 assumptions of the formula
ξi+1.  
[D1]3
(((D1 → C) → D1) → D1)
[(((Di+1 → ξi) → Di+1)
→ Di+1) → ξi]5
Π
ξi
C
3
D1 → C [(D1 → C) → D1]4
D1
4
((D1 → C) → D1) → D1
[(((Di+1 → ξi) → Di+1)
→ Di+1) → ξi]5
Π
ξi
C
5
((((Di+1 → ξi) → Di+1) → Di+1) → ξi) → C
Figure 6. Proof of ϕi+1 in M→ with 2i+1 discharged assumptions of ξi+1
Theorem 5.5 shows that 2i is the lower bound for number of assumption occur-
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rences of a sole formula in any normal proof of ϕi in M→.
Theorem 5.5 Any normal proof of ϕi in M→ has at least 2i assumption occur-
rences of ξi.
Proof We prove that for any i, there is no normal proof of ϕi with less than 2
i
assumption occurrences of ξi. We ﬁrst observe that ϕ1, i.e., ((((D1 → C) → D1) →
D1) → C) → C is not provable with only one occurrence of ξ1 = (((D1 → C) →
D1) → D1) → C). If this was the case we would have, from an analysis of the form
of the normal proof of C from ξ1, that ((D1 → C) → D1) → D1 would be provable
in M→, and this cannot be the case since this formula is only classically valid. A
Kripke model with two worlds such that in the ﬁrst world neither C nor D1 holds
and in second D1 holds but not C falsiﬁes (((D1 → C) → D1) → D1). That is,
with
M = 〈{1, 2}, {1  1, 1  2, 2  2}, {V (1) = ∅, V (2) = {D1}}〉
then M 
|= αi(D1 → C), i = 1, 2, so, M |= αi(D1 → C) → D1, i = 1, 2. Thus, we
hava that M 
|= α1((D1 → C) → D1) → D1.
Consider that there are normal proofs of ϕi with less than 2
i assumption occur-
rences of ξi. So there is the least k (k > 0), such that, ϕk has a normal proof with less
than 2k assumption occurrences of ξk. Let Σk be such proof. Since ϕk = ξk → C,
this proof is as follows. We remember that every open assumption in Σk has the
form ξk.
[ξk]
l
Σk
C
l
ξk → C
Since ξk = χ[Dk, ξk−1] = (((Dk → ξk−1) → Dk) → Dk) → ξk−1, it has to be
major premise of an →-elim rule. If this is not the case then ξk would be a minor
premise of a →-elim rule having a major premise of the form ξk → β. This formula
on its turn has to be sub-formula of the open assumption of this branch, for the
derivation is normal and ξk → β can only be conclusion of an application of an
→-elim rule. Since the only open assumption in Σk is ξk itself, the case of ξk as
minor premise is not possible. Thus, as ξk is a major premise, Σk has the following
form, remembering how is ξk, showed in the ﬁrst line of this paragraph.
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Σ′
(((Dk → ξk−1) → Dk) → Dk) [(((Dk → ξk−1) → Dk) → Dk) → ξk−1]l
ξk−1
Σk
C
l
ξk → C
Note that Σ′ is a sub-derivation of Σk and it must have ξk as open assumption too.
It must have an open assumption, for (((Dk → ξk−1) → Dk) → Dk) is not provable
in M→. As ξk is the only possible open formula in Σk, then Σ′ has ξk at least one
occurrence of ξk open in it. It is very important to note that each occurrence of ξk
in Σk has a companion derivation of the form Σ
′ with ξk open in it. Thus, if we
remove every Σ′ from Σk we end up with the following proof:
[ξk−1]l
Σk−1
C
l
ξk−1 → C
The proof above is a proof of ϕk−1 with less than 2k−1 assumption occurrences of
ξk−1 discharged by the last rule. This is a consequence of the fact that we have
removed at least one assumption of ξk when removing Σ
′. That is we have at least
divided the amount of assumption occurrences of ξk by two. So, the resulting pruned
derivation contradicts the fact that k is the least number holding this property, since
it is a derivation of ξk−1 → C with less than 2k−1.  
We have proved that any normal proof of ϕn has at least 2
n assumption oc-
currences of ξn. The size of ϕn (s(ϕn)) is the length of the string representing it
in an alphabet Λ with more than one symbol. Whatever is the size of ϕn, any
normal proof of it has at least 2n occurrences of a formula of size s(ϕn) − 2, since
s(ξn) + 2 = s(ϕn). Thus, we can aﬃrm that the least size of any normal proof of
ϕn is super-polynomially bounded when compared to the size of ϕ itself. Let Πn be
any normal proof of ϕn, then the ratio
s(Πn)
s(ϕn)
is:
s(Πn)
s(ϕn)
>
s(ξ)× 2n
(s(ξ) + 2)
Let us now consider this fact to estimate the size of a normal proof of ϕn on the
basis of the size of n. In order to simplify the evaluation, we consider that the length
of a formula is the amount of occurrences of propositional letters in it. The real size
is linearly proportional to what we call here as length, since for each propositional
there is at most one → symbol in ϕ. Parenthesis will be ignored in this evaluation.
By the later discussion we can see that 2 × len(ϕ) ≥ s(ϕ). The analysis will be
accomplished using length (len) to measure the size of strings.
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The form of ϕn is ξn → C, the length of ϕ (len(ϕ)) is 1+ len(ξn). ξn is deﬁned in
a recurrent way by χ[Di, ξi−1], with ξ1 = ((D1 → C) → D1) → D1. As len(ξ1) = 5
and len(ξi+1) = 2× len(ξi) + 3, we can deduce 6 that len(ξn) = 2n−1 × (5 + 3)− 3,
and hence len(ϕn) = 2
n−1 × (5 + 3)− 2.
From the previous discussion, we found out that the formulas ϕn are of super-
polynomial size on n. In fact, the strings that represent them are huge on n.
However, the minimal amount of occurrences of ξn in any normal proof of ϕn is not
less than 2n, so we have that:
(2n)× (2n−1 × (5 + 3)− 2) < len(Πn)
for any normal proof Πn of ϕn. Finally we have
(2n)× (2n−1 × (5 + 3)− 2)
(2n−1 × (5 + 3)− 3) <
s(Πn)
s(ϕn)
and hence there is κ > 1, such that s(Πn)s(ϕn) = κ
s(ϕn).
6 Discussing the compression power of Classical Logic
Here we discuss the normal proofs of ϕ inK→ andKI→ . We show that any normal
proof of ϕn in KI→ or K→ is not super-polynomially bounded by the size of ϕn.
The main reason for that is the fact that χ[Dk, ξk−1] = (((Dk → ξk−1) → Dk) →
Dk) → ξk−1 has a normal proof of size k × η × s(ϕk), where η is a constant. As
a matter of a clear presentation we show in ﬁgure 7 the proof in ﬁgure 5 adapted,
and iterated, to our present discussion.
Π1
((D1 → C) → D1) → D1
Πk−1
((Dk−1 → ξk−2) → Dk−1) → Dk−1
Πk
((Dk → ξk−1) → Dk) → Dk
[(((Dk → ξk−1) → Dk)
→ Dk) → ξk−1]1
ξk−1
ξk−2
...
ξ1
C
1
((((Dk → ξk−1) → Dk) → Dk) → ξk−1) → C
Figure 7. Proof of ϕk in purely KI→
Remembering that
ξ1 = (((D1 → C) → D1) → D1) → C
and that
ξk−1 = (((Dk−1 → ξk−2) → Dk−1) → Dk−1) → ξk−2
6 Use your favorite method to solve recurrence equations
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[A]
B → A
(B → A) ∨ (A → B) [((B → A) ∨ (A → B)) → B]
B
A → B
(B → A) ∨ (A → B) [((B → A) ∨ (A → B)) → B]
B
(((B → A) ∨ (A → B)) → B) → B
Figure 8. Proof of Dummet’s formula needs at least two repeated assumptions
[A]
A ∨ ¬A [(A ∨ ¬A) → ⊥]
⊥
¬A
A ∨ ¬A [(A ∨ ¬A) → ⊥]
⊥
((A ∨ ¬A) → ⊥) → ⊥
Figure 9. Proof of Tertium non-datur formula needs at least two repeated assumptions
The proofs Πi, i = 1, k, have all size 9× (s(ξi))+3). This can be checked out by an
inspection in the proof in ﬁgure 1, making A = Di and B = ξi. We can note that
s(ξi) ≤ s(ξk), i = 1, k, and hence the size of the whole proof is upper bounded by
k × 9× (s(ξk)) + 3).
In this particular case K→ saves space in a larger amount than M→. We could
think that this is a very particular situation. In fact this is not the case. Figures 9
and 8 are examples of proofs of classical tautologies that can be used to obtain
similar classes of formulas with exponentially many assumptions need in normal
proof. This time we have to use the full propositional minimal logic, that is, the
minimal logic with the other logical constants {∧,∨,¬,⊥}, the same regarding its
classical counterpart. Thus, the formulas proved in these ﬁgures can be used to
provide other examples of the compressing power obtained by the use of Classical
reasoning. We will work out this conjecture on a forthcoming article.
We can generalize the situation discussed here. Let α be such that 
M→ α and
there are β and γ, such that, α M→ β and γ, β M→ α. We can conclude thatKI→ α, as shown in the right derivation below. Besides that, in the case that the
left derivation has exponentially many assumptions of α → β, we conjecture that
by a similar reasoning applied in the case of the class of formulas ϕn we can use
KI→ to have a proof of (α → β) → β of polynomial size.
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[γ]
|
α [α → β]
β
|
β′
γ → β′
|
α [α → β]
β
((α → β) → β
[γ]
[γ]
|
α ¬α
⊥
¬γ
⊥
β
|
β′
γ → β′
|
α ¬α
⊥
α
7 Conclusion
Taking into account that M→ is the hardest and most representative proposi-
tional logic to deﬁne eﬃcient proof-procedures, we show an example alerting for the
fact that allowing unlimited use of assumptions is worth for any complete proof-
procedure. This example runs in M→. We are not aware of a similar one running in
classical logic. Classical propositional logic is more eﬃcient than M→ if such exam-
ple does not exist. Propositional logic complexity has a lot of conjectures, starting
with the relations between the main complexity classes. This article has the sole
purpose of providing an example where the exponential grow of proofs has nothing
to do with disjunction and combinatorial principles like the Pigeon-Hole 7 . The
class of formulas ϕn and other obtained in a similar way from classical tautologies
are such examples.
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